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Abstract 
The Organization of Midwest ISO States (OMS) launched the Midwest Demand Resource 
Initiative (MWDRI) in 2007 to identify barriers to deploying demand response (DR) resources in 
the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) region and develop policies to overcome 
them. The MWDRI stakeholders decided that a useful initial activity would be to develop more 
detailed information on existing retail DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs, program rules, 
and utility operating practices. This additional detail could then be used to assess any “seams 
issues” affecting coordination and integration of retail DR resources with MISO’s wholesale 
markets. 
 
Working with state regulatory agencies, we conducted a detailed survey of existing DR 
programs, dynamic pricing tariffs, and their features in MISO states. Utilities were asked to 
provide information on advance notice requirements to customers, operational triggers used to 
call events (e.g. system emergencies, market conditions, local emergencies), use of these DR 
resources to meet planning reserves requirements, DR resource availability (e.g. seasonal, 
annual), participant incentive structures, and monitoring and verification (M&V) protocols.  This 
report describes the results of this comprehensive survey and discusses policy implications for 
integrating legacy retail DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs into organized wholesale 
markets. Survey responses from 37 MISO members and 4 non-members provided information on 
141 DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs with a peak load reduction potential of 4,727 MW 
of retail DR resource. Major findings of this study area: 
 
• About 72% of available DR is from interruptible rate tariffs offered to large commercial 
and industrial customers, while direct load control (DLC) programs account for ~18%. 
Almost 90% of the DR resources included in this survey are provided by investor-owned 
utilities. 
• Approximately, 90% of the DR resources are available with less than two hours advance 
notice and over 1,900 MW can be dispatched on less than thirty minutes notice. These 
legacy DR programs are increasingly used by utilities for economic in addition to 
reliability purposes, with over two-thirds (68%) of these programs callable based on 
market conditions. 
• Approximately 60% of DLC programs and 30% of interruptible rate programs called ten 
or more DR events in 2006. Despite the high frequency of DR events, customer 
complaints remained low. The use of economic criteria to trigger DR events and the 
flexibility to trigger a large number of events suggests that DR resources can help 
improve the efficiency of MISO wholesale markets. 
• Most legacy DR programs offered a reservation payment ($/kW) for participation; 
incentive payment levels averaged about $5/kW-month for interruptible rate tariffs and 
$6/kW-month for DLC programs. Few programs offered incentive payments that were 
explicitly linked to actual load reductions during events and at least 27 DR programs do 
not have penalties for non-performance. 
• Measurement and verification (M&V) protocols to estimate load impacts vary 
significantly across MISO states. Almost half of the DR programs have not been 
evaluated in recent times and thus performance data for DR events is not available. For 
many DLC programs, M&V protocols may need to be enhanced in order to allow 
   xiii
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participation in MISO’s proposed EDR schedule. System operators and planners will 
need to develop more accurate estimates of the load reduction capability and actual 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The unusually hot summer of 2006 broke peak electricity demand records in most parts of the 
country, including the Midwest.  The success of system operators across the nation in “keeping 
the lights on” despite record peak demands was partially due to the use of demand response (DR) 
resources (Hopper et al. 2007). The Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) called on 
retail DR programs and tariffs to provide emergency operating reserves on both August 1 and 2, 
2006. On these days MISO operators declared an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Level 2 and 
requested Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to interrupt non-firm load. A 3,000 MW drop in peak 
demand (see Figure 1) on August 1st and 2,000 MW on August 2nd were sufficient to avoid 
triggering scarcity pricing and helped minimize the possibility of outages.  
 
 
Figure 1: Midwest ISO August 1 2006 Generation and Load Summary (MISO, 2006) 
 
Although an impressive demonstration of the value of demand response, these emergency 
operations revealed discontinuities between the needs of regional system operators and the 
organization of retail demand response programs. Since MISO did not have a regional 
emergency demand response program in place, load reductions were achieved according to the 
legacy retail program procedures of individual LSEs and states.1 MISO was unable to predict or 
control the amount of DR resources needed to maintain system reliability, and the load 
reductions undertaken by LSEs and their customers could not be compensated by MISO.2  
Moreover, some LSEs and large customers were actually penalized for responding to the MISO 
dispatcher request for load interruptions during the August 1-2, 2006 emergency because of 
                                                 
1 “Legacy” retail programs refer to those DR programs administered by LSEs that existed before the formation of 
MISO. 
2 In some cases utilities compensated retail customers for load reductions according to the tariffs (e.g. interruptible 
contracts).  
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MISO market rules governing departures from scheduled generation and deviations from 
accepted load offers at the balancing authority level.3  
 
Inclusion of retail DR resources in resource adequacy planning and use of these resources in 
regional transmission operations requires coordination between wholesale and retail electricity 
markets.  When MISO called for emergency demand response in August 2006, not much was 
known on a region-wide basis about the quantity and type of retail DR resources that could be 
expected to respond and under what conditions. These retail programs range from legacy 
interruptible contracts with large customers to load control programs for small residential and 
commercial customers.  
 
This report describes a survey undertaken to inventory retail DR resources that can provide 
sufficient aggregated loads to be valuable as an emergency resource at the regional level. The 
survey collected detailed information regarding the operational capabilities and limitations of 
retail DR resources. An important objective of the study was to help identify issues that MISO 
members, state regulators and other stakeholders may need to address in incorporating legacy 
retail DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs into MISO wholesale markets. The study is 
organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of the wholesale and retail electricity 
markets in the Midwest while Section 3 describes institutional arrangements and stakeholders in 
the Midwest ISO and Organization of Midwest States. Section 4 reviews the existing and future 
role of DR resources in MISO markets and operations. The DR program survey approach and 
scope is described in Section 5, while survey results are presented in Sections 6 and 7. Key 
findings and conclusions are discussed in Section 8. 
 
                                                 
3 FERC subsequently waived these penalties (also referred to as “uplift charges”) retroactively and proposes to 
eliminate them in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric 
Markets” (Docket Nos. RM07-19-000 and AD07-7-000), February 22, 2008.  
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2. Wholesale and Retail Electricity Markets in the Midwest 
Established in 2001, MISO is one of nine independent and regional transmission organizations 
(RTOs) that the FERC has approved to carry out regional system and market operations. MISO 
extends over a broad reach of Midwestern North America, from eastern Montana and the 
Canadian province of Manitoba through the upper Midwest and south to parts of Kentucky and 
Missouri (see Figure 2). MISO is responsible for the reliable operation of nearly 94,000 miles of 
interconnected high voltage power lines serving more than 100,000 MW of demand and 40 
million people throughout the Midwest, as well as administering one of the world's largest 
energy markets, and ensuring that the Midwestern bulk power infrastructure expands to meet the 
growing regional demand for power. 
 
 
Figure 2: MISO Reliability “Footprint” (Source: ICF, 2007) 
 
Development of a regional transmission operator and organized wholesale markets in the 
Midwest has taken a distinctive path compared to other RTOs such as New England or PJM. In 
2005 MISO became the first multi-state RTO without a history of tightly-pooled power sharing 
arrangements to implement organized wholesale energy markets (day-ahead and real time) with 
centralized economic dispatch and locational marginal pricing. In doing so MISO and its 
stakeholders grappled with several complicated issues: (i) the need to accommodate the 
reliability rules of four different regional reliability entities (Mid-America Interconnected 
Network or MAIN, East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement or ECAR, Mid-
Continent Area Power Pool or MAPP,; and SERC, or SERC Reliability Corporation); (ii) 16 
retail jurisdictions with varying approaches towards retail competition and mix of electric utility 
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ownership structures;4 and (iii) the need for a single transmission tariff that could accommodate 
regional variations in marginal losses (Drom et al. 2005).5  
 
MISO has subsequently developed ancillary services market designs that provide for Regulation, 
Spinning Reserves, and Supplemental Reserves to be acquired via bid and auction markets 
instead of bilateral procurement.6 This new Ancillary Services Market, scheduled for a 
September 2008 launch, will allow co-optimization of energy and ancillary services provision 
and increased participation of demand response (MISO 2007a). A key element of the 
introduction of co-optimized Energy and Ancillary Services Markets  is consolidation of the 
multiple (i.e. 23) Balancing Authorities now responsible for providing reliability services into a 
single regional Balancing Authority under the auspices of MISO (see Figure 2). Because of the 
vast territory contained within the regional footprint, MISO is also developing a zonal scheme 
for managing the procurement and provision of Operating Reserves.7  
 
Although MISO does not operate a capacity market, it coordinates regional planning processes to 
ensure that sufficient generation and transmission capacity is added to meet the reliability and 
demand growth needs of the region (MISO 2007b).  
 
 
                                                 
4 Three states (Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) have implemented retail competition, eight states 
(Missouri, Kentucky, Iowa, Montana, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin) retain monopoly 
provision of retail electric service, one state (Ohio) allows retail competition for certain customer classes, and 
one state (Nebraska)  is fully served by public power.  
5 ECAR and MAIN have ceased operations and the region they covered is not part of ReliabilityFirst Corporation or 
RFC. MAPP has been replaced by Midwest Reliability Organization or MRO. 
6 At present Transmission Customers must provide for their own Operating Reserves through: 1) self-supply; 
2) bilateral contracts; 3) take cost-based service from the Balancing Authority in which their Load is located; 
or 4) as a last resort, request the Midwest ISO to procure the necessary Operating Reserves on their behalf. 
7 These Reserve Zones will allow transmission constraints and other physical limitations to be taken into 
account in meeting reliability requirements imposed by NERC. The Reserve Zones will also disperse the 
clearing of Operating Reserve on Resources throughout the Midwest ISO Balancing Authority Area. Separate 
requirements will be established for Regulating Reserve, Spinning Reserve and Supplemental Reserves.  
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3. Institutional Arrangements and Stakeholders 
Since inception MISO has stressed close coordination among state regulators in the development 
and operation of the regional transmission grid and electricity markets. The Organization of 
Midwest ISO States (OMS) was formed in 2003 to advise MISO and the FERC and provide a 
technical resource to the individual state regulators.8 The OMS coordinates electricity 
transmission and wholesale market policy and planning oversight among the states within the 
MISO footprint, provides recommendations to MISO, FERC, and other government entities, and 
intervenes in FERC proceedings. The OMS has a Board of Directors and an Executive 
Committee, and topical working groups that cover key issues including congestion management, 
market power mitigation, pricing, resource adequacy, demand response, market implementation, 
transmission planning, and seams issues. 
 
In 2004 MISO formed a Demand Response Working Group (DRWG) within its Market 
Subcommittee. The DRWG consists of MISO staff and stakeholders including regulators and 
Market Participants (MPs) and develops recommendations to allow existing and potential DR 
resources full participation in MISO markets. The DRWG is responsible for developing new 
business practices, tariff language and protocols governing the participation of DR in day-ahead 
and ancillary services markets and for emergency purposes.9
 
In October 2006, the Organization of Midwest ISO States (OMS) launched the Midwest Demand 
Resource Initiative (MWDRI). The goal of the Initiative is to identify and develop remedies to 
retail barriers to the deployment of DR resources in the MISO region, including state and 
regional policies and market-enabling activities. MWDRI efforts are focused on retail DR 
programs and dynamic pricing tariffs and are intended to complement the ongoing efforts of 
MISO Working Groups that address demand response (e.g., DRWG and Resource Adequacy 
Working Group).   
 
                                                 
8URL: http://www.misostates.org/ 
9 DRWG Charter and DRWG 2008 Management Plan. Both available at: 
http://www.midwestiso.org/publish/Folder//30a6c2_101ed99cd65_-7fe40a48324a
   5
Coordination of Retail Demand Response with Midwest ISO markets  
4. Status of Demand Side Management in Midwest ISO 
There are two principal types of demand-side management (DSM) resources: energy efficiency 
(EE) and demand response (DR). While the objective of EE is to permanently reduce the demand 
for energy in intervals ranging from seasons to years, DR’s objective is to change customer 
demand in intervals that range from minutes to hours during specific conditions (e.g., high 
demand, congested networks, or high prices). This study focused specifically on DR resources. 
 
Figure 3 presents the main types of DR resources. DR resources can be characterized in terms of 
whether they are dispatchable by the system operator (or program administrator) or the customer 
alone decides when to reduce load (i.e. non-dispatchable). Customers enrolled in dynamic 
pricing tariffs (e.g. hourly pricing, critical peak pricing, and time-of-use pricing) would typically 
fall under the non-dispatchable DR resources category while direct load control, interruptible 
rate programs, and demand bidding programs would be under the dispatchable category - see 
NERC (2007) for a detailed discussion of DR program typology. 
 
Demand-Side 
Management
Demand Response Energy Efficiency
Dispatchable Non-Dispatchable
Reliability Economic Time-Sensitive Pricing
Direct Load Control Demand BiddingInterruptible
 
Figure 3: Types of Demand-Side Management Resources (Source: NERC, 2008) 
 
MISO coordinates with utilities in their role as Balancing Area Authorities to dispatch demand 
response resources for the benefit of the entire MISO interconnected system (IRC 2007). The 
various ways (existing and future) in which DR resources can participate in MISO markets and 
operations are shown in Table 1. 
 
Currently, DR resources formally participate in MISO operations through the wholesale energy 
market only. LSEs can offer DR resources, similar to generation resources, in the day-ahead or 
real-time energy market. In this case MISO decides whether to dispatch the DR resources or not. 
Alternatively, LSEs can also use DR resources as part of their price-sensitive demand curve. In 
this situation, the LSE decides whether to dispatch its DR resources or not in an effort to manage 
its wholesale market price risk. 
 
In the future, DR resources will be able to participate in Ancillary Services Markets. Recently, 
FERC also approved MISO’s proposal to allow DR resources to satisfy the resource adequacy 
requirements of LSEs as described in Module E of MISO’s Transmission Tariff.  DR resources 
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would receive capacity credits comparable to those received by generators. DR resources 
receiving capacity credits would be dispatched during emergency conditions in accordance with 
business rules that are still under development. 10 Unlike several other RTOs, MISO does not 
directly administer DR programs at the present time. 
Table 1: How DR resources can participate in MISO markets?  
MISO Platform Method of DR Participation 
Non-Dispatchable by MISO 
Day-ahead and Real-time 
energy markets 
Price-sensitive demand: LSEs indicate how much energy they will buy for a given 
price.11
 
Dispatchable by MISO 
Day-ahead and Real-time 
energy markets 
DRR offers: LSEs can bid DR resources in the energy markets similar to 
generation resources. If offer is accepted then LSE must deliver the load reduction 
or pay a penalty. 
 
Ancillary services market 
(ASM) 
DRR offers: LSEs can bid DR resources in ASM similar to generation resources. 
During power system contingencies, LSEs must deliver load reductions.  
 
(Note: ASM will begin operations in September 2008). 
Resource adequacy 
requirements (Module E) 
LSEs can utilize their DR resources to meet their resource adequacy requirements. 
When EEA2 alert is issued, LSEs must reduce load as defined in Module E.  
 
Emergency demand 
response program 
(Schedule 30) 
DRR offers: LSEs can bid DRR in this program. During EEA2, if MISO has 
exhausted resources in energy markets, ancillary services market, and Module E 
then offers bid into Schedule 30 will be according to ascending order of offer 
prices.  
 
(Note: FERC has not yet approved Schedule 30. However, MISO has begun the 
process of developing the business process manual.) 
Only for Planning Purposes 
Long-term planning MISO has proposed that it would include DR resources formally in its planning 
process in future. 
Source: Mike Robinson, MISO 2008 
 
On December 31, 2007, MISO filed a proposed Emergency Demand Response (EDR) Schedule 
30 with FERC, which provides payments from MISO to load-serving Market Participants (MP) 
that curtail loads during emergency events (i.e., EEA2 and EEA3).12  Only authorized MPs 
would be allowed to participate in Schedule 30, which would be the first DR program to be 
directly administered by MISO. In order to be compensated under this proposed program, 
participants will be required to submit an EDR offer to MISO at least 30 days ahead of the 
calendar month in which the offer is valid. Each offer must remain in force for one month and 
include: (1) minimum and maximum amounts of demand reduction; (2) minimum and maximum 
                                                 
10 One issue of contention among stakeholders is the advance notice requirements for DR resources in order to 
qualify as a load-modifying resource under Module E. 
11 Anecdotal evidence suggests that currently, a significant portion of DR resources participates in the MISO market 
in this manner. LSEs adjust their daily load projections for expected DR reductions for those days they intend to use 
DR resources. 
12 On April 22, 2008 FERC conditionally approved MISO’s Emergency Demand Response Schedule 30. However, 
FERC also directed MISO to address several issues not included in the proposal. Currently, MISO is working with 
various stakeholders to address the issues raised by FERC. 
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number of continuous hours of demand reduction; (3) any shutdown costs associated with the 
demand reduction; (4) number of hours of advance notice required before reduction and any time 
of day limitations; and (5) a firm offer price (subject to a $3,500/MWh cap). MISO will issue 
instructions regarding the start time, reduction amount, and necessary duration of curtailment 
during emergency events for accepted bids. Compensation would be based on the higher of the 
real-time LMP or the EDR Offer price for the amount of demand reduction included in MISO’s 
instructions. In case of non-compliance, a penalty would be incurred. 
 
In terms of operations during system contingencies, MISO will first dispatch the generation and 
DR resources offering bids in the Ancillary Services Market according to merit order. If ASM 
resources are unable to meet the demand, MISO will begin issuing sequential warnings and 
emergency alerts. When an EEA2 alert is issued, MISO will first ask LSEs to dispatch the 
resources accredited under Module E. If the Module E resources are not sufficient to meet the 
demand, MISO will dispatch the DR resources enrolled under EDR Schedule 30 according to 
merit order.13
 
 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that this order of dispatch may be revised in the future. 
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5. Purpose and Approach of the Survey  
Market participants (MP) administering retail DR programs and state regulators are concerned 
whether the requirements that MISO includes in its EDR Schedule 30 and Ancillary Services 
market for DR resources are consistent with the requirements already embedded in legacy 
programs and tariffs. To better inform this discussion and assess differences and similarities 
among existing retail DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs in the MISO footprint, MWDRI 
decided to conduct a detailed survey. 
 
A team comprising the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and the Regulatory 
Assistance Project (RAP) surveyed the retail DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs 
administered by MISO member utilities as well as other utilities operating in OMS member 
states. The survey template was developed by the DR program design subgroup of MWDRI with 
input from OMS members. State regulatory commissions transmitted the survey to utilities in 
their states and requested their cooperation in describing their retail DR programs and dynamic 
pricing tariffs. The survey coverage generally included all load serving MISO MPs along with 
several utilities that are not MISO members but whose service territories are in OMS states. In 
some states, surveys were not sent to rural cooperatives and municipal utilities either because 
PUCs did not have jurisdiction or utility staff contacts. LBNL staff compiled the survey data, 
conducted follow-up interviews and consistency checks to ensure accuracy of the survey 
responses, supplemented survey data with information from other sources, and analyzed the data. 
 
Utilities were asked to provide information on retail DR programs (e.g., interruptible, direct load 
control or DLC, emergency programs, and demand bidding programs where events are triggered 
by high prices), dynamic pricing tariffs (including Real Time Pricing, or RTP; and Critical Peak 
Pricing, or CPP), and voluntary DR programs (i.e., a program where customers voluntarily 
participate and make a "best efforts" attempt to curtail load when requested but are not 
compensated). 
 
Interruptible rate programs provide a rate discount or bill credit to the customer for curtailing or 
shedding load upon request. Typically, interruptible programs are offered to larger industrial and 
commercial customers and often involve penalties if the customer fails to curtail load when 
requested to do so. DLC programs involve an end-user (typically, residential or small 
commercial) who agrees to allow their utility or a curtailment service provider to control an 
appliance or device within certain pre-set limits of frequency and duration. Participants in DLC 
programs typically receive compensation in the form of bill credits and/or payments based on 
performance during events. Customers enrolled in a Demand Bidding or economic DR program 
offer bids to curtail load based on market prices. These programs are mainly offered to large 
customers; however, some utilities also allow aggregation of small customer loads. 
 
An RTP tariff provides variable hourly pricing for all hours of the year, while a CPP tariff 
provides variable pricing only for a relatively few number of hours per year when the utility calls 
a CPP event. A one-part dynamic pricing tariff assesses all volumetric (per kWh) charges based 
on variable hourly prices. A two-part dynamic pricing tariff incorporates a customer baseline 
(CBL) usage which establishes a long-term average hourly usage profile for each customer. 
Variable hourly prices are applied only to the differences between actual hourly load and the 
CBL. Two-part CBL-based real-time tariffs are a hedge against the implicit price-exposure risk 
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of variable hourly prices as the bulk of a customer's consumption is billed on the customer's 
otherwise applicable tariff. Hourly prices can be indexed to wholesale energy market prices (i.e. 
either day-ahead or real-time) or utility marginal costs. 
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6. Survey Results: Overview of Existing DR Resources 
Thirty-five utilities responded to the survey with information on 141 DR programs and dynamic 
pricing tariffs. Of these, four utilities (that reported information on 13 DR programs and 3 
dynamic pricing tariffs) are not members of MISO but operate in states that belong to OMS. The 
analysis reported here includes all 141 programs. 
 
The size of the DR resource is defined as the potential peak load reduction that the utility expects 
from the DR program or dynamic pricing tariff, which is consistent with the approach taken by 
FERC and EIA. The utilities reported retail DR resources totaling 4,727 MW, of which 757 MW 
are from MISO non-members (~16%).Response to the survey was quite good as MISO member 
utilities reported DR program resources of ~3,649 MW of DR resources, compared to the 4,099 
MW reported in the latest FERC DR report (FERC 2007). 
 
The distribution of DR resources by state is shown in Figure 4. States with the most DR 
resources include Minnesota (1,245 MW), Indiana (731 MW), and Michigan (822 MW). Note 
that OMS member states such as Illinois and Pennsylvania have large DR resources, although 
some utilities in these states were not sent or did not respond to the survey because they were not 
MISO members (e.g., Commonwealth Edison is a member of PJM). 
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Figure 4: State-Level Distribution of DR Resources 
Figure 5 shows how survey respondents characterized their retail demand response program 
offerings. Interruptible tariffs account for ~72% of the DR resource, while DLC programs 
account for ~18%, and economic programs account for ~3% of existing DR resources. 
Interruptible tariffs and DLC programs are offered in almost all OMS member states, however, 
economic programs were offered by LSEs only in Indiana and Ohio.  
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Interruptible Tariffs
76 Programs
3,397 MW (N = 60)
Direct Load Control
41 Programs
855 MW (N = 36)
Economic Programs
5 Programs
154 MW (N = 3)
72%
3%
18%
7%
Dynamic Pricing Tariffs
19 Programs
321 MW (N = 12)
 
Figure 5: Distribution of DR resources by program type 
 
Dynamic pricing tariffs account for ~7% of the total DR resource. Fifteen entities reported that 
they offer 19 dynamic pricing tariffs in their service territories. However, utilities reported 
information on potential peak load reductions for only 13 dynamic pricing tariffs. Survey 
respondents estimated that customers enrolled in these dynamic pricing tariffs could provide 321 
MW of potential load reductions in aggregate. It is important to note that customer enrollment 
(and potential load reductions) for dynamic pricing tariffs vary significantly across utilities with 
five utilities accounting for 92% of the potential load reductions (see Table 2). CPP tariffs 
accounted for only 7 MW of DR resources. Only one utility called its CPP tariff in 2006 
(approximately 60 events) that yielded ~4 MW of actual load reductions. 
 
Table 2: Dynamic Pricing Tariffs: Top five utilities ranked by potential load reduction and peak 
demand of enrolled customers. 
Utility Potential Peak Load Reductions (MW) 
Peak Demand of Enrolled 
Customers (MW) 
Utility A 150 360 
Utility B 72 84 
Utility C 29 60 
Utility D 25 25 
Utility E 20 40 
Remaining 
utilities 25 229 
TOTAL 321 MW 798 MW 
 
Almost 50% of the RTP tariffs (all two-part tariff design) rely on the utility’s marginal cost to 
determine the hourly component of the price, while the remaining RTP tariffs are indexed to 
either MISO’s real-time or day-ahead energy market price. The RTP tariffs primarily target non-
residential customers. With one exception, the design of dynamic pricing tariffs involves an 
“opt-in” approach as customers must voluntarily choose to enroll on a dynamic pricing as 
opposed to an “opt out” approach where dynamic pricing tariff is designated as the default tariff. 
None of the potential load reductions from the dynamic pricing tariffs are currently bid into the 
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MISO wholesale energy markets. Six utilities count the potential load reductions from their 
dynamic pricing tariffs towards their planning reserves.  
 
Eighteen utilities reported that they operate voluntary, emergency DR programs that do not offer 
compensation for load curtailments. Approximately ~61% of these programs recruit customers 
actively through public appeals, advertising, customer education, and targeted marketing to large 
customers. Five utilities reported that they have enrolled ~138 customers in these voluntary DR 
programs. Only four utilities have called these programs in recent years and six utilities 
periodically contact enrolled customers to see if they are willing to participate in the program in 
future. 
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7. Survey Results: Retail DR Program Characteristics 
The survey requested detailed information about a range of DR program characteristics, 
including operational triggers, frequency of events, advance notice provided, program duration, 
participation requirements (e.g. size thresholds, market segments, etc.), communications 
arrangements, monitoring and verification protocols, and others. This section discusses these DR 
resource characteristics and their potential implications for participation in MISO markets by DR 
resources. 
 
7.1 Operational Triggers 
Respondents were asked to describe what triggered the operation of DR programs. The most-
frequent uses of DR programs reported were maintaining system reliability, reducing the cost of 
procuring power during high price periods, maintaining system demand below contracted levels, 
and addressing local reliability or congestion problems (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Operational Triggers for DR Programs  
Program 
Type 
System 
Emergency 
High 
Prices 
Maintain demand 
below contracted levels 
Local/utility 
reliability/ congestion 
DLC 28 25 21 16 
Economic 1 5 0 1 
Interruptible 66 49 35 42 
TOTAL 95 79 56 59 
 
Approximately ~81% of programs and ~87% of potential peak load reductions are triggered for 
system emergencies. Interestingly, over two-thirds (~68%) of all DR programs (~70% of 
enrolled load reductions) are triggered for economic reasons. This result is somewhat surprising 
as historically DLC and interruptible rate programs were justified primarily for reliability 
purposes and dispatched only during system emergencies. These results suggest that many 
Midwest utilities have found additional benefits in dispatching DR programs in response to 
market conditions (e.g. high day-ahead or real-time market prices) and system conditions 
(manage contracted demand to lower overall utility system costs, relieve congestion). Some 
survey respondents noted that regulators have given them additional flexibility in recent years to 
decide how DR resources are deployed and the number of times they can be deployed. LSEs also 
reported an increase in DR events triggered by economic conditions since MISO markets began 
operating. 
 
Respondents indicated that 79 DR programs can be triggered for economic reasons (i.e. high 
prices); however, only 13 DR programs (9 interruptible and 3 DLC accounting for ~580 MW) 
actually bid into MISO’s day-ahead energy market. It appears that many LSEs are acting as 
“price-takers” instead of having to commit to reduce a specific amount of load if their bid is 
accepted.  
 
Most DR programs have more than one operational trigger: 83% of DR programs which account 
for 94% of enrolled load reductions. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the potential load reductions 
respectively for DLC and interruptible rate programs for each type of operational trigger. The 
Venn diagram representation allows one to readily see the use of multiple triggers. 
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For example, about 47% of potential load reductions from DLC programs are dispatched for both 
reliability (system-wide and/or local) and economic purposes. Potential DLC load reductions 
triggered for purely economic reasons (i.e., high prices) account for ~37% of the total load 
reductions while DLC programs triggered for purely reliability purposes account for ~17% of the 
total load reductions. 
Total = 794 MW
System Emergency
High Prices
Local Reliability
113 225
0
19
0
287
150
 
Figure 6: Overlap of operational triggers for DLC programs 
In contrast, the potential load reductions from interruptible programs that are triggered purely for 
economic reasons account for only ~1% of the total potential load reductions. Approximately 
33% are triggered for purely reliability purposes and ~65% for both reliability and economic 
purposes. A much larger portion of potential load reductions (~52% compared with ~28%) from 
interruptible rate programs are triggered for all three purposes as compared with those from DLC 
programs.  
 
Total = 3,321 MW
System Emergency
High Prices
Local Reliability
1,025 1,731
0
82
0
44
439
 
Figure 7: Overlap of operational triggers for interruptible rate programs 
 
This wide-spread use of DR resources for economic reasons suggests that program operators are 
capable of valuing the resource purely in economic terms as opposed to using it as a last resort 
for ensuring system reliability. For participation in MISO’s energy markets or the proposed EDR 
schedule (and possibly future ancillary services market), program administrators will need to 
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develop an offer price for their DR resources. Past experience in monetizing the value of DR 
resources should make it easier for program administrators to develop offer prices. 
 
7.2 Frequency of DR Events 
Respondents were asked to provide information on program operating limits as well as 
operational experience in recent years. More than one-third (~36%) of respondents reported that 
their DR programs did not have any limits on operational frequency. 
 
Survey respondents also indicated that more than 60% of DLC programs and 30% of 
interruptible rate programs were called ten or more times in 2006 (see Figure 8). Follow-up 
discussions with some utilities suggest that the large number of DR events is a consequence of 
using economic criteria as operational triggers. Utilities also indicated that there were not many 
customer complaints despite the high frequency of DR events. 
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Figure 8: Frequency of DR Program Operations (2006) 
 
The lack of annual limits on maximum number of events called or maximum hours of load 
reductions coupled with the fact that LSEs do not report significant customer satisfaction issues 
suggests that many LSEs may have the flexibility to continue calling and relying on DR 
resources for a variety of needs (e.g., emergency, economic, local congestion). 
 
7.3 Advance Notice Requirements 
The proposed EDR Schedule 30 calls for participants to specify the number of hours of advance 
notice required before demand can be reduced. Therefore, the advance notice requirements for 
existing retail DR programs are of interest. As shown in Table 4, 83% of DR programs 
(representing 89% of potential load reductions) require less than 2 hours advance notice. Nearly 
all DLC programs provide either no or less than 30 minutes of advance notice to customers, 
which is not surprising given that equipment (e.g. air-conditioning unit, water heater) is cycled 
directly by the utility. Surprisingly, over one-third (~36%) of interruptible programs provide 
relatively short notice (i.e., less than 30 minutes advance notice) to customers. Utilities reported 
that over ~1900 of customers were on interruptible rate programs that provide 30 minutes to 2 
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hours notice. The majority of economic programs are “day-ahead” programs, bidding load 
curtailments into the day-ahead energy market. 
Table 4: Advance Notice Requirements for DR Resources 
Potential Enrolled Load Reductions (MW) 
Program Type Less than 
30 minutes 
30 minutes 
– 2 hrs 
2 - 4 
hrs 
4 - 12 
hrs Day-ahead 
DLC 740 10 0 0 0 
Economic 0 0 0 0 154 
Interruptible 1,221 1,927 202 7 31 
TOTAL 1,961 1,937 202 7 185 
 
The survey results suggest that over 90% of the existing DR resource could provide load 
curtailments with two hours or less of advance notice.  A significant amount of that load (1960 
MW) is available on just 30 minutes notice. One of MISO’s challenges in implemented EDR 
Schedule 30 will be “stacking” the DR resource offers for dispatch according to the relative 
merit order of advance notice and other characteristics. The proposed Schedule 30 language 
notes that dispatch instructions will be sent to accepted offers in the event of EEA2 and EEA3 
alerts, but does not specify exactly when the alerts are initiated and dispatch instructions sent to 
the DR resources. 
 
7.4 DR Resource Availability 
Over the past two years MISO has called on DR resources to provide operating reserves in both 
the summer (danger of demand exceeding supply) and the winter (equipment failure).14 This 
suggests that access to DR resources throughout the year has value for MISO system operators. 
Although certain DR resources will always be available only seasonally (e.g., air-conditioner 
load control), it is possible to develop a portfolio of DR programs that provides operating 
reserves year-round. 
 
The survey results suggest that almost all of the DR programs and tariffs are available during 
summer months (either because the programs require year round or summer availability), when 
the probability of a DR event is higher (see Table 5). Surprisingly, more than two-thirds of all 
DR programs and tariffs, at least on paper, can be operated year-round (~50% of DLC programs, 
and ~75% of interruptible rate programs). However, it is likely that some DR programs never get 
called during off-peak months (e.g., air conditioner or agricultural pump load control). 
Consequently, the potential load reductions available during non-peak months (e.g. winter season 
in lower Midwest region) could be much lower than reported. 
Table 5: Seasonal availability of DR resources 
Number of Programs Program 
Type Summer only 
Summer & 
Winter 
Winter 
only 
Year-
round TOTAL 
DLC 16 3 2 20 41 
Economic    5 5 
Interruptible 15 2 2 57 76 
TOTAL 31 5 4 82 122 
                                                 
14 Hopper et al. (2007). 
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The proposed MISO EDR Schedule 30 requires market participants to specify their offers one 
month in advance and to provide one months notice if the offer is to be changed. The offer must 
describe the restrictions on the availability of the DR resource (i.e. minimum and maximum 
hours, times during the day, days during month when the load reduction is available). Hence, DR 
program administrators will have to develop resource availability estimates by month in order to 
develop appropriate offers for participation in the MISO EDR program. 
 
7.5 Participation Requirements 
Some DR programs establish eligibility or threshold criteria for enrollment, or target specific 
customers. For example, DLC programs are targeted to residential and small commercial 
customers while interruptible rate programs are targeted to large industrial and commercial 
(including government, educational institutions, and others) customers. Respondents indicated 
that other types of eligibility criteria were also employed in lieu of or in addition to market 
segment. 
 
The most commonly cited criteria were the minimum size of load reduction offered by customer, 
minimum level of customer peak demand, presence of specific types of equipment or appliances 
(e.g., air conditioners) and access to onsite generation (see Table 6). The category “other” 
referred to contracts negotiated between an individual customer and the utility. Approximately 
25% of DR programs explicitly indicated that they had no specified eligibility criteria. About 
48% of DR programs allow participating customers to meet their program commitments using 
onsite generators in lieu of load reductions. 
 
Table 6: DR Program Participation Requirements (MW) 
Program 
Type 
Certain 
End-uses Required 
Min. Size of 
Load Reduction 
Minimum 
Customer Demand Other 
DLC 191   301 
Economic  154   
Interruptible 8 841 1,008 247 
Total 199 995 1,008 548 
 
The survey results indicate that minimum size thresholds for curtailable load and customer 
maximum demand are most commonly used as program eligibility criteria. These eligibility 
criteria allow LSEs to target larger customers whose participation is easier to administer. 
However, if aggregation is allowed, then a load aggregator may be able to enroll many smaller 
customers in these programs. The proposed MISO EDR Schedule 30 does not include any 
eligibility criteria or aggregation rules; hence, potentially all existing DR resources may be able 
to participate. 
 
7.6 Measurement and Evaluation 
Participation in MISO’s proposed EDR schedule or in MISO energy markets requires the ability 
of the LSE to accurately measure and evaluate the actual load reduction. However, survey 
respondents indicated that barely half (~54%) of retail DR programs have been evaluated in the 
last 2-3 years. Many of these LSEs may be relying on older evaluations or engineering estimates 
   18
Coordination of Retail Demand Response with Midwest ISO markets  
of load reductions, rather than evaluation of actual load reduction results from recent DR events. 
A robust measurement and evaluation (M&E) protocol is necessary to estimate actual load 
reductions. 
 
Only half (~50%) of the respondents provided detailed information on measurement and 
evaluation (M&E) protocols for their DR programs. Of these responses, the great majority 
(~80%) used interval meter data for evaluating the load impacts from interruptible programs. 
Customer baselines for measurement of actual load reduction were defined as part the M&E 
protocol. 
 
The most common M&E method used for DLC programs (~77%) used substation level SCADA 
data to measure aggregate load impacts during DR events. This technique does not measure or 
estimate actual load reduction for each participating customer. Exclusive reliance on this method 
might prove to be a barrier in aggregating these loads for participation in MISO’s proposed EDR 
Schedule 30, where compensation depends on actual and verifiable load reduction from 
participating customers. 
 
Less than one-quarter (~19%) of the DLC programs used load research or other statistical 
methods to improve the accuracy of their load reduction estimates.15 These methods are 
commonly used for non-interval metered participants in ISO DR Programs in other regions (e.g., 
ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM). 
 
Overall, the survey response suggests that M&E protocols vary quite a bit across the MISO foot-
print. MISO does not include a specific M&E protocol in its proposed EDR schedule; rather, the 
proposed EDR Schedule 30 provides for MISO review and approval of M&E protocols on a 
case-by-case basis. Although this approach may expedite initial approval of the program, in the 
long-run, MISO needs an M&E protocol that is applied uniformly and yields comparable results.  
 
7.7 Program Incentive Design and Compensation Levels 
The survey also requested information on DR program incentive design, the type and size of 
incentives provided, and the basis for determining incentive levels. The results show 
considerable variability in incentive design and compensation levels across LSEs, states, and 
program types. Incentives were provided via bill discounts (i.e. $/month, $/season, $/year), 
capacity payments (i.e. $/kW offered per month or season or year), performance payments 
($/kWh paid according to a single event), and capacity-performance payment combinations.  
 
The most commonly offered incentive design is the capacity or reservation payment with or 
without a pay-per-event performance payment. MISO proposed EDR schedule 30 offers only a 
performance payment for load curtailed as its incentive. Hence, for many DR programs, LSEs 
and state regulators may need to address the issue of aligning the compensation received by 
LSEs from MISO for curtailing load during emergency events with the actual incentives 
currently paid to the end-use customer through the existing retail tariff. 
                                                 
15 This methodology consists of extrapolating the measured actual load reductions for a sample of participants 
to the population of participants in a DLC program using various statistical methods and data analysis 
techniques. 
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Figure 9 and Figure 10 present the monthly capacity payments provided for interruptible rate 
programs and DLC programs, respectively. Reported capacity payments were converted to a 
common metric -- $/kW-month - in order to compare incentives across programs. The average 
incentive was $5/kW-month for interruptible rate programs, although there is significant 
variation across utilities (e.g. incentives ranged from $1 to $12/kW month). 
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Figure 9. Distribution of incentives offered to interruptible tariff customers 
Figure 10 segments the DLC program incentives in terms of the end-use appliance targeted by 
the program (i.e., air conditioners, and water heaters). The average size of the incentive provided 
to customers is $6/kW-month for the 22 DLC programs that provided this information. The 
variation in incentive levels across DLC programs is less than that observed among interruptible 
tariffs. For example, ~77% of the programs provide incentives between $4/kW-month to $8/kW-
month. Incentives offered to customers in water heating DLC programs are relatively lower than 
those offered to customers in air-conditioning (A/C) programs. About 55% of A/C DLC 
programs provide incentives greater than $6/kW-month, while ~88% of water-heater DLC 
programs provide incentives less than $6/kW-month. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of incentives offered to DLC program customers 
Approximately 30% of the 122 DR programs indicated that they have some type of penalty 
provision if customers do not curtail load during a DR event. Utilities use a variety of approaches 
to ensure that enrolled customers actually curtail during events: 25 programs include a monetary 
   20
Coordination of Retail Demand Response with Midwest ISO markets  
penalty for non-performance; four programs include mandatory “buy-through” provisions (i.e., 
the customer is required to pay the real-time market price for load not reduced), and seven 
programs include provisions that remove enrolled customers from future participation in the 
program (and loss of incentives) for failure to perform.  Survey respondents indicated explicitly 
that there were no adverse consequences for non-performance in 27 DR programs. The penalty 
described in MISO EDR schedule is of the form $/MWh. 
 
The most commonly used valuation basis for determining the size of incentives is the cost of a 
peaking unit (e.g., a natural gas-fired combustion turbine). As shown in Figure 11, more than 
80% of DLC programs and more than 60% of interruptible rate programs use this valuation 
basis. About 17% of interruptible programs report using wholesale energy prices and ~12% used 
avoided costs (i.e. these include avoided transmission and distribution costs in addition to 
generation costs) to set incentive levels. 
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Figure 11. Valuation basis for DR program incentives 
 
Many retail DR programs were approved prior to the formation of MISO and were justified 
primarily on reliability grounds. However, although “emergency” DR programs are increasingly 
being utilized for economic reasons, this reality is not fully reflected in cost-effectiveness 
screening practices used in some MISO states. Anecdotal information also suggests that many 
LSEs provide “price-sensitive demand bids” in MISO day-ahead energy markets and use high 
prices from energy markets to trigger their DR programs. Going forward, state regulators may 
want to direct utilities to consider and assess the full range of DR program applications in MISO 
markets in cost-effectiveness screening and in setting appropriate incentive levels. 
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8. Findings and Conclusions 
This study provides the first comprehensive assessment of legacy DR resources in the MISO 
foot-print. The size of the DR resource that responded to this survey is 4,727 MW of which 
~84% is available in the MISO service territory through 141 DR programs and dynamic pricing 
tariffs. Interruptible programs account for ~72% of the DR resource, while DLC programs 
account for ~18%. Almost 90% of the DR resources included in this survey are provided by 
investor-owned utilities. 
 
Approximately 87% of the DR resource utilizes an operational trigger linked to system 
emergency conditions, although most programs allow for multiple triggers. Surprisingly, about 
70% of the DR resource can also deployed by LSEs for economic reasons. The frequency of use 
of DR programs for economic reasons has increased since MISO markets began operating. 
Approximately 60% of DLC programs and 30% of interruptible rate programs called ten or more 
DR events in 2006. Despite the high frequency of DR events, customer complaints remained 
low. The use of economic criteria to trigger DR events and the flexibility to trigger a large 
number of events suggests that DR resources can help improve MISO wholesale markets. 
 
Approximately, 90% of the DR resources are available with less than 2 hours advance notice and 
over 1,900 MW are available with less than 30 minutes notice. Almost all of the DR resources 
are available in summer and 67% of the programs throughout the year. However, the fact that a 
program operates throughout the year does not mean all potential load reductions from the 
program are available in each month. System planners will have to develop estimates of DR 
resource availability by season (or month) instead of using the existing estimates. 
 
M&V protocols vary across MISO foot-print. For many DLC programs, M&V protocols may 
need to be enhanced in order to allow participation in MISO’s proposed EDR schedule. MISO is 
in the process of developing M&V protocols that are consistent across its service territory. 
Almost half of the DR programs have not been evaluated in recent times. Hence, data on 
performance during DR events is not available. System operators and planners will need to 
develop more accurate estimates of the load reduction capability and actual performance. 
 
Most legacy DR programs offered a reservation payment ($/kW) for participation; incentive 
payment levels were about $5/kW-month for interruptible rate programs and $6/kW-month for 
DLC programs. Most utilities indicated that the avoided cost of a peaking unit was used as the 
valuation basis in cost-effectiveness screening and in setting incentive levels. Few programs 
offered incentive payments that were explicitly linked to the actual load reduction during an 
event and at least 27 DR programs do not have penalties for non-performance. 
 
If MISO’s proposed revisions to its emergency procedures are approved by FERC, it is unclear 
to what extent utilities will actually enroll their customers in this new MISO DR program. LSEs 
and participating customers would receive additional incentive payments during emergency 
events (up to $3,500/MWh), but LSEs will incur additional transaction costs, and LSEs and 
participating customers will face penalties for non-performance. For example, an LSE will have 
to specify the minimum and maximum amounts of curtailed load, the number of hours of 
advance notice required and whether such reductions are limited to certain hours, periodically 
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bid and update offer prices for curtailed load, accurately estimate load curtailments or be subject 
to penalties, and develop and negotiate an acceptable M&V protocol with MISO. 
 
Participation and enrollment of legacy DR resources in the MISO emergency DR protocols may 
ultimately hinge on whether it is made a requirement for LSEs that want to take resource 
adequacy credit for their DR resources as part of the MISO reliability planning process. At a 
minimum, utilities and state regulators may have to rethink and possibly revise some provisions 
of legacy DR programs that relate to customer’s obligations and incentives for curtailing load 
during system emergencies, penalties for non-performance, periodic testing of existing DR 
assets, and more consistent M&V protocols. 
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